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Abstract
Recent work has shown that additive threat mod-
els, which only permit the addition of bounded
noise to the pixels of an image, are insufficient for
fully capturing the space of imperceivable adver-
sarial examples. For example, small rotations and
spatial transformations can fool classifiers, remain
imperceivable to humans, but have large additive
distance from the original images. In this work,
we leverage quantitative perceptual metrics like
LPIPS and SSIM to define a novel threat model
for adversarial attacks.
To demonstrate the value of quantifying the per-
ceptual distortion of adversarial examples, we
present and employ a unifying framework fus-
ing different attack styles. We first prove that our
framework results in images that are unattainable
by attack styles in isolation. We then perform
adversarial training using attacks generated by
our framework to demonstrate that networks are
only robust to classes of adversarial perturbations
they have been trained against, and combination
attacks are stronger than any of their individual
components. Finally, we experimentally demon-
strate that our combined attacks retain the same
perceptual distortion but induce far higher mis-
classification rates when compared against indi-
vidual attacks.
1. Introduction
Modern deep neural networks are demonstrating ground-
breaking performance for image classification and other
related tasks but were recently discovered to be vulnerable
to input manipulations. Adversarial examples are slight al-
terations to an input that completely change the output of
a classifier but are imperceivable by humans. Adversarial
examples have received significant and justified recent at-
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tention, see e.g. (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Madry et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Su
et al., 2017; Xiao et al., 2018; Engstrom et al., 2017). It was
recently demonstrated that even real-world physical objects
can be manufactured to fool classifiers (Athalye et al., 2017;
Kurakin et al., 2016) under various lighting and sensing con-
ditions. Beyond the obvious security concerns, adversarial
examples illustrate that modern complex models can make
correct predictions for completely wrong reasons.
One fundamental issue for all security problems is precisely
defining a threat model. Obviously, it is easy to fool any clas-
sifier by replacing the input with a vastly different image, but
adversarial examples have to remain visually imperceivable
to humans. This notion of perceptual similarity is loosely de-
fined and has been classically hard to quantify, though there
is a rich literature in constructing perceptual similarity met-
rics (Donahue et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2004; Zhang et al.,
2018). However, `∞ bounds are most commonly used as a
proxy for a perceptual metric in the domain of adversarial
examples; every pixel is allowed to be modified indepen-
dently by only a small amount. While it is true that adding
a small amount, in some `p sense, of noise to an image will
generate images that are perceptually indistinguishable, the
converse is not necessarily true: not all perceptually similar
perturbations can be generated by addition of small `p noise.
Specifically, it has been shown that tiny rotations (Engstrom
et al., 2017) or spatial transformations (Xiao et al., 2018)
suffice to fool an image classifier.
We motivate our work as follows: if human perception is
robust to the addition of small `∞ noise as well as small
rotations, translations and spatial transformations, then it
is likely that human perception is robust to combinations
of these types of transformations. Referring to `p-bounded
noise as attacks that impact the texture of an image and spa-
tial transformations as attacks that impact the geometry of
an image, we generate attacks that leverage the adversarial
power of modifying the both the texture and geometry of an
image by composing various attacks that each perform one
type of perturbation.
In this paper we argue that the most relevant threat model
is the one governed by human perception. We phrase ad-
versarial examples as a search over a parameter space of
perturbations and demonstrate that including parameters for
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both texture and geometry allows a more effective search
over the space of perceptually similar images. We generate
adversarial attacks using both texture and geometry trans-
formations that induce significantly higher misclassification
rates than either technique alone, while retaining the same or
more perceptual similarity to the original images. In the de-
fense domain, we show that networks adversarially trained
against either technique alone are vulnerable to the other
technique, lending empirical credibility to the claim that
there exist orthogonal attack styles (Engstrom et al., 2017),
and that state-of-the-art adversarially defended networks
overfit on `p-style attacks (Schott et al., 2018).
1.1. Our Contributions
• We demonstrate that our proposed combination attacks
are stronger compared to additive and spatial transfor-
mation attacks of equal or lesser perceptual distortion.
• For our extensive experimental validation, we devel-
oped a new PyTorch toolbox for creating combinations
of adversarial attacks using percetual metrics, geomet-
rical transformations and various other types of image
transformations. Our package, called mister ed ,
consists of more than 5 thousand lines of code and
streamlines the design of perceptual adversarial attacks
and defenses. We expect that our toolbox will facili-
tate research in perception-based adversarial machine
learning.
• We prove that an attack that combines an addition of
`∞-constrained noise and a constrained spatial trans-
formation can generate a larger class of images than
either attack style alone under some mild assumptions
on the image that hold almost always for real images.
• We present evidence to suggest that various attack
styles are orthogonal: networks defended against a
particular style of attack are not robust to attack styles
that were not defended against.
1.2. Related Work
Adversarial examples are modifications to the input of a
machine learning algorithm that are carefully chosen to
drastically change the algorithm output. The first instances
of these arose in 2004, where carefully-crafted emails were
designed to evade spam filtering algorithms (Dalvi et al.,
2004; Lowd & Meek, 2005). Adversarial machine learn-
ing algorithms have become an extremely popular area of
study in recent years; see also the comprehensive survey by
Biggio et. al (Biggio & Roli, 2017). In the image classifica-
tion domain, most of the literature has focused on a threat
model defined by using only `p perturbations: attackers are
only allowed to add some `p-bounded noise to an image
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Madry et al., 2018), where the
amount of noise is typically constrained to not be too large
by a threat model. This noise is optimized to maximize
the classifier loss by leveraging gradients of the neural net-
work. Recently there has been some work in constructing
adversarial examples by rotating, translating or performing
spatial transformations on images (Engstrom et al., 2017;
Xiao et al., 2018). These are distinct threat models, as even
a minor translation or rotation of an image could generate
a large `p distance. In general, any transformation can be
efficiently leveraged in an adversarial attack as long as the
transformation is differentiable.
While it is clear that adding perceptual noise δ to image
x can be viewed as x + δ, it is less clear how arbitrary
spatial transformations can be modeled while maintaining
differentiability. Spatial transformer networks (Jaderberg
et al., 2015) were developed as a plug-and-play module to
use as a layer in a DNN, similar in spirit to a convolutional
layer. Spatial transformation layers work by computing a
grid of new pixel locations and using bilinear interpolation
to compute the pixel values in the new image. The grid
is computed as a function of an image as well as learned
parameters. Maximally these parameters can define the
exact location of each new pixel, but the class of affine
transformations could be modeled using only 6 parameters
(4 for rotation, 2 for translation). Critically, bilinear inter-
polation is differentiable with respect to the parameters so
we can leverage first-order methods to efficiently conduct
adversarial attacks.
Although computing a quantifiable metric for the percep-
tual distance between two images is inherently challenging
due to the subjective nature of human perception, there is
a rich literature for measuring the similarity between two
images. `p norms serve as one such proxy, though these are
not robust to minor spatial transformations such as trans-
lation or rotation and have been shown to not be sufficient
in adequately describing human perception (Sharif et al.,
2018). Other efficiently-computable similarity scores exist,
such as PSNR and SSIM (Wang et al., 2004). Recently
work (Zhang et al., 2018) has demonstrated that comparing
normalized cosine distances in activation layers of a DNN
trained to classify real images can perform exceptionally
well as a similarity score, as backed up by an extensive
human study. Quantifying perceptual distortion is of high
interest to computer vision, and it is safe to assume that tech-
niques for computing image similarity will only improve
over time. It is for this reason that our approach towards
adversarial attacks attempts to be metric-agnostic, with the
only requirements being that we require the similarity scores
to be symmetric, reflexive and efficiently computable.
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2. Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we let f be a multiclass-classifier
that maps real vectors with n features into one of C classes.
We suppose that f is trained on some distribution of real
data X , and we refer to elements of the input space Rn as
images. The power set operator is defined by P(·). We are
only interested in adversarial attacks where the adversary
has strict constraints on how it can perturb the given inputs.
Certainly this is necessary, as discussing the strength of
an attack, or robustness to attacks is crucially dependent
upon what the adversary is allowed to do: without such
constraints, an adversary is allowed to replace a given image
with any image. To this end, we define a threat model as
follows
Definition 1 (Threat Model). A threat model is a function
t : P(Rn) → P(Rn) that takes as input a set of images
and outputs a set of images that are valid perturbations the
adversary can perform to an input image.1
As an example, typical threat models considered for MNIST
allow `∞ perturbations of 0.3, and for CIFAR-10, `∞ pertur-
bations of 8/255 are typically allowed. With a well-defined
threat model, we define an adversarial attack as follows:
Definition 2 (Adversarial Attack). An adversarial attack
is a function A : Rn → Rn parameterized by both a
classifier and a threat model mapping an image to an
adversarial perturbation of the image such that for all
x ∈ supp(X), A(x) ∈ t(x). We say the attack is suc-
cessful on image x if f(x) 6= f(A(x)).
Our work applies to the white box setting, where the adver-
sary has access to both the classifier f and its gradients. We
focus on untargeted adversarial attacks, though our work
can be easily extended to the targeted setting. For a given
threat model, we now phrase the problem of defining the
function A as an optimization problem where
A(x) := arg max
y∈t(x)
Loss(x, y)
for some loss that is maximized when f(x) 6= f(y). This
is typically either solved using first order techniques where
projection back onto the feasible set t(x) is performed after
each gradient step, or, in the case of the attacks presented in
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017a), the threat model is brought to
the objective through a Lagrange term and a binary search
over the scaling factor is performed. It should be noted
that in the Carlini-Wagner attacks, the threat model is typi-
cally not strict and the optimization aims to minimize some
1Note that, traditionally, the input to a threat model is the
singleton image for which we are generating adversarial examples
and the output is the set of valid adversarial examples. We define
it more generally over sets as we will compose various attacks,
though we overload notation as such: t(x) := t({x}).
distance function while still inducing misclassification; to
incorporate this under our strict threat model framework,
we define a threat model and reject any generated examples
outside of the threat model.
3. Our Approach
In this section, we detail our primary contributions. We
first reiterate our motivation through a toy example. We
next formalize our attack procedure and provide examples
of attacks we compose. We then show that our motivation
for attack composition is grounded in theory.
3.1. Motivating Example
Consider  balls centered at the origin induced by various
metrics in some space, such as those shown in Figure 1.
These balls may have some nonempty intersection; however,
there are regions in our space that are within  of the origin
in some metric but not in the others. Now, if we let these
metrics be the “magnitudes” of various perturbations, the
value of this line of reasoning becomes clear. Specifically,
suppose we perform some spatial transformation on our
image, such as a translation. Although a small translation
is usually nearly imperceptible, the `p distance between the
new image and the original image is large. Thus it is likely
that there exist some perceptually similar images which
cannot be attained by minimizing some `p norm between
the generated example and the original image. We can
extend this same line of reasoning to other measures of
perturbation magnitude.
Recall that our goal is to generate images that are per-
ceptually similar but result in differing model evaluations.
Phrased differently, we seek to efficiently parameterize the
“perceptual ball” around a given example x in such a way
that permits efficient exploration. Certainly this perceptual
ball is covered by an `p ball of sufficiently large size, though
even a small rotation has a potentially large `p norm while
having a minimal perceptual difference from the original
example. Thus, should our parameterization of our adver-
sarial attack depend only on an `p-constrained additive δ,
it is unlikely that standard iterative techniques will gener-
ate an adversarial example corresponding to a small spatial
transformation. This suggests that a reparameterization of
our search space is necessary.
We can better approximate the perceptual ball by the com-
position of several small, parameterized perturbations to an
image. Each perturbation is of a different flavor - for in-
stance, we could add an `∞-constrained δ to our image and
then perform an  translation. By composing several attack
classes together, our hope is to approximate this region of
perceptually similar images and parameterize it in such a
way that standard iterative optimization techniques will be
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Figure 1. Left: Observe that the space of all perceptually small perturbations is not necessarily covered by the space of small `p or flow
perturbations. Right: We sequentially perturb this example image from ImageNet using larger-than-necessary perturbations for expository
purposes. The perturbations are, from left to right: original, δ-addition, flow perturbation, translation, rotation.
able to explore the entire set of perceptually similar images.
As an alternative way of viewing the notion above, consider
the problem of image classification: given a distribution
over images, typically viewed as vectors in Rn, and their
corresponding labels, a classifier attempts to learn the subset
of Rn corresponding to each label. That is, it attempts to
efficiently characterize a potentially nonconvex space. Neu-
ral nets, which simply repeatedly compose linear operators
and nonlinearities, perform tremendously well on this do-
main. Borrowing this intuition, we can better approximate
the perceptual ball by sequentially applying various classes
of attacks.
3.2. Attack Procedure
Building on the intuition described above, we generate at-
tacks as a composition of several smaller attacks, each of
which is called a “layer”. Each layer is parameterized by
its own threat model. The total threat model of the attack is
simply the composition of the constituent threat models.
t = tL ◦ tL−1 ◦ . . . ◦ t1.
where ti is the threat model of layer i for i ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
For each image that is adversarially attacked, each layer
maintains a set of parameters that are optimized during the
attack generation process. Typically the threat model for
each layer limits the set of parameters that are valid, e.g.
each layer’s parameters are `p-bounded. Similar to DNNs,
there are multiple classes of layers that can be applied. Here
we list a few that we use, noting that this procedure could
work with any composition of differentiable transforma-
tions.
• Delta additions are parameterized by δ, where the
transformation applied to image x yields x + δ. We
optimize over the choice of δ, where the threat model
usually constrains δ to be bounded in an `p sense. The
number of parameters for this layer is exactly equiv-
alent to the number of pixels times the number of
channels in x. This class of transformation is what
is considered for all `p style attacks.
• Affine transformations are parameterized by an affine
transformation matrix θ, which is a 2× 3 matrix. We
constrain these to be rotations, translations, and dila-
tions. Threat models for layers of this class typically
constrain the maximum allowable angle, shift, and
scale for rotations, translations and dilations respec-
tively. Rotations and translation layers were considered
in (Engstrom et al., 2017).
• Flow networks are parameterized by a full sampling
grid. Each output pixel maintains a horizontal and ver-
tical coordinate dictating where it is sampled from the
input image (Jaderberg et al., 2015). While affine trans-
formations can also be parameterized by a sampling
grid, we use the term “flow networks” to specifically
describe transformations that are maximally parame-
terized: the number of parameters is twice the total
number of pixels in the input image2. Threat models
in this class constrain the `∞ distance between the co-
ordinates of the original and sampled pixel. This class
2Note that we classify affine transformations and flows differ-
ently since their threat models vary. For example, a rotation of 5◦
may be within our threat model whereas the flow change caused
by this rotation on the boundaries could possibly violate the flow
threat model.
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Figure 2. Here are adversarial examples generated from an image in ImageNet. The center image is the unperturbed image. The left image
is generated with a large δ-addition. The right image is generated with a large non-smooth spatial perturbation. Note that the perturbation
generated by each loss is far larger than is necessary to result in a misclassification.
of transformations is considered by the work in (Xiao
et al., 2018).
Broadly, we refer to affine transformations and flow net-
works as “spatial transformations.”
3.3. Threat Model Search Space
Our reasoning for composing different attack types is in-
tuitive: there exist certain images that have regions that a
spatial attack can exploit well but an additive attack cannot
and vice versa. For instance, flow attacks are powerful in
image regions with high contrast, such as borders or object
boundaries, but are weak in regions with low contrast, such
as flat backgrounds or image interiors. On the other hand,
additive attacks are not as powerful as flow in high contrast
areas as they can make only small perturbations whereas
flows can take the value of its neighbouring pixels. By ex-
panding our threat model, we can obtain the best of both
worlds, thereby better parameterizing the space of percep-
tually similar images. We emphasize that by constraining
the amount of additive noise and spatial transformations
allowed we are able to better approximate a perceptual ball
in a principled fashion. We can also demonstrate that the
search space for combined attacks is strictly larger under
mild assumptions.
Theorem 1 (Informal). For an image I, consider the two
threat models defined by an `∞ perturbation of at most δ and
a flow attack where grid sampling is allowed within an `∞
ball of size . Then if there exist both low and high-contrast
areas in I, then there exists some perturbed image I ′ that
is attainable via a combination of the aforementioned threat
models but is not attainable by each threat model alone.
We defer the formal theorem statement and proof to the
appendices.
4. Experiments
4.1. Adversarial Example Toolbox
To support our experiments and make it easier for others to
experiment with adversarial examples, we have developed
an extensive adversarial example toolbox that incorporates
a variety of state-of-the-art attacks, training techniques and
evaluation methods. This toolbox, known as mister ed
is built on top of the popular PyTorch machine learning
framework (Paszke et al., 2017) and is intended to be a
PyTorch equivalent to the cleverhans library (Papernot
et al., 2018). This toolbox fundamentally incorporates op-
timization over the parameter space of transformations, as
opposed to relying on simply additive transformations. This
toolbox and tutorials are hosted on a public github repo.
4.2. Experimental Setup
We experiment on classifiers trained on CIFAR-10 and Ima-
geNet. For experiments on CIFAR-10, we use a ResNet32
architecture using pretrained weights that has 92.63% accu-
racy on the validation set (Krizhevsky, 2009; He et al., 2016;
Idelbayev, 2018). For experiments on ImageNet, we use
a NASNet-A Mobile architecture using pretrained weights
that has 74.08% accuracy on the validation set (Cadene,
2018; Russakovsky et al., 2015; Zoph et al., 2017). Adver-
sarial examples generated using our methods on CIFAR-10
are displayed in Figure 3 and further examples on both
datasets are displayed in the appendices. We primarily dis-
cuss results for CIFAR-10 since we have found that Ima-
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Table 1. Description of attacks, corresponding threat model and optimization procedure used.
Attack Type Threat Model Optimization Procedure
Delta Additive transformation `∞ ≤ 8 FGSM/PGD
R Rotation about the center Angle |θ| ≤ pi/24 PGD
T Translation (horizontal and vertical) Distance ≤ 3.2 pixels PGD
StAdv Flow networks Distance ≤ 1.6 pixels PGD with TV loss (τ = 0.05)
geNet classifiers are extremely vulnerable to even the most
basic adversarial attacks.
Unless otherwise noted, we use Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) to generate our attacks. We use the Carlini-Wagner
style loss using f6 with κ = 0 (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a)
as the adversarial loss, presenting results for whichever is
stronger. For all flow-network based attacks, we use the total
variation flow loss to enforce local smoothness, with τ =
0.05 and refer to this style of attacks as StAdv (Xiao et al.,
2018). We perform PGD until the loss converges, with a
minimum of 100 iterations, using Adam as an optimizer with
learning rate of 0.01, projecting into the hard constraints
defined by the threat model at each iteration. Our FGSM
attack has a step size of 8 and projects the attacked example
onto the range of valid images after stepping.
We have found that the ordering of the layers does not
have a significant effect on the attack’s effectiveness, but
when describing combined attacks as Layer1 + Layer2, we
perform the attack in Layer1 first and then apply Layer2. We
optimize all sets of parameters for multilayer threat models
simultaneously.
4.3. Attack Effectiveness Against Adversarial Training
Here we consider various CIFAR-10 classifiers trained via
an adversarial training procedure (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
as a means of defense against adversarial attacks. We then
evaluate these defenses against both existing attacks as well
as several sequential compositions of attacks. We use com-
binations of layers with the shorthand notations and hard
constraints mentioned in Table 1. The results are shown in
Table 2.
Different attack layers are “orthogonal.” Combining
attack layers yields remarkably powerful attacks as we have
greatly expanded the set of valid adversarial images by re-
laxing the threat model. In particular, spatial attacks are
strong against delta defended networks and vice versa. For
example, the StAdv trained network can only successfully
defend against delta attacks in 0.36% of validation images.
While a delta trained network is also weak against an StAdv
attack (14.02%), it is the strongest defense against orthogo-
nal attacks. Further, the strengths of disjoint attacks seem
to stack: rotation and translation alone perform poorly on
a delta defended network (58.91%), though when applied
in combination with a delta attack, they decrease classifier
accuracy from 38.14% to 18.70%. Since both delta and
StAdv attacks are quite powerful by themselves, combining
them should yield an even more powerful attack that per-
forms well against both delta defended networks and StAdv
defended networks. Our experimental results confirm this.
The Delta + StAdv combined attack is the strongest of all
attacks evaluated, even against a network trained against
attacks of this style alone (9.74%).
A larger threat model does not necessarily imply a
stronger defense. Notice that every attack is best de-
fended by a network trained against that class of attacks
only. In other words, for any particular single attack style,
the network that best defends against this attack is the net-
work that saw adversarial examples of that style only. For
example, a Delta + R + T defended network performs worse
against a Delta attack (34.29 %) than just a Delta defended
network (38.14 %).
4.4. Combined Attacks Are Strong Without the
Perceptual Cost
Observe the following simple fact: as we relax the threat
model, say by increasing the allowable `∞ perturbations in
a delta addition attack, the attack strength cannot decrease,
since any attack allowed in the stricter threat model must
also be allowed under the more relaxed threat model. Allow-
ing a larger `∞ perturbation, however, could increase the
perceptual distance of an adversarial example, suggesting
that there is a tradeoff between the looseness of the threat
model and perceptual distance of generated adversarial ex-
amples.
Our goal is to find a threat model that generates strong adver-
sarial examples that also have minimal perceptual distortion.
To do so, we quantify attack strength as the percentage of
successful attacks against correctly classified images from a
given data set. We quantify perception with both LPIPS and
(1-SSIM) (Zhang et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2004). Note that
for ease of exposition, we multiply LPIPS and (1-SSIM) dis-
tance by 1000 and 100 respectively. We try various combi-
nations of threat models of stAdv and delta addition attacks
on the network that has been defended against the combina-
tion of stAdv and delta attacks and summarize our results
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Figure 3. Adversarial examples on a CIFAR-10 trained ResNet32 defended against delta addition and StAdv attacks. The left figure are the
adversarial examples, with the rows being various styles of attack: [original, delta, rotation+translation, stAdv, delta+rotation+translation,
delta + stAdv, delta + StAdv + rotation+translation]. The right figure is the difference between the attacked image and the original image
magnified by 5.
Table 2. The table shows the accuracy of defended networks (rows) for various attacks (columns). Note that lower values imply stronger
attacks and weaker defenses. For example, the entry with row FGSM and column StAdv indicates that 0.39% of the samples were
successfully defended by the network adversarially trained using FGSM, implying that StAdv is a strong attack against FGSM and FGSM
is a weak defense for StAdv. As can be seen, the proposed attack (last column) is significantly stronger than all previously known attacks.
Ground R + T FGSM Delta Delta +R + T StAdv
Delta +
StAdv
Undefended 92.4 56.02 18.02 0.00 0.00 1.75 0.00
FGSM 90.07 62.11 95.01 0.49 0.69 2.56 0.05
Delta 81.28 58.91 47.83 38.14 18.70 14.02 5.42
Delta + R + T 83.53 70.27 47.45 34.29 28.24 16.05 4.97
StAdv 83.62 71.41 18.33 0.36 0.39 23.90 0.07
Delta + StAdv 82.07 63.98 47.06 36.71 24.82 24.30 9.74
in Table 3. We display a heatmap describing the strength
and LPIPS distance as a function of these bounds in Figure
4. Note that we use our best defended network for these
experiments as undefended networks are so susceptible to
adversarial attacks that they do not generate interpretable
results.
The strongest threat model is the one that allows the largest
perturbations, which is able to generate examples that are
classified correctly 9.74% of the time. However, observe
that this threat model generates examples that are not as
perceptually indistinguishable as more constrained threat
models. It is interesting to note, however, that augmenting
flow attacks with delta attacks results in more perceptually
indistinguishable attacks. On the other hand, incorporating
a small amount of allowable flow to an additive-only attack
both decreases classifier accuracy and perceptual distortion,
making it a strictly better attack in both senses. This phe-
nomenon is also present when incorporating a small amount
of additive noise in an otherwise pure flow attack, though it
is not as pronounced. Furthermore, notice that decreasing
Table 3. Accuracies and perceptual distance of various threat mod-
els of combined delta+stAdv attacks against a network defended
against delta+stAdv attacks. The Delta column refers to how much
additive noise is allowed, in terms of `∞, and the Flow column
refers to the `∞ bound on how much flow is allowed, in terms
of pixels. The accuracy column measures the accuracy of the de-
fended network against the attack, so smaller means a stronger
attack. Our central finding is illustrated in the last row: A combi-
nation attack is both stronger and has better similarity as measured
by both LPIPS and SSM.
Delta Flow Accuracy LPIPS (1 - SSIM)
0 1.6 24.30 5.00 3.63
8 0 36.09 2.83 1.79
8 1.6 9.74 4.13 2.75
4 0.8 28.20 2.67 1.67
2 1.6 22.03 3.45 2.57
8 0.4 22.81 2.63 1.56
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Figure 4. Heatmaps of accuracy of a CIFAR-10 classified ResNet defended against combinations of additive and flow attacks (left) and
the average LPIPS distance of the generated adversarial images (right). The x-axis of each figure corresponds to allowable additive
noise, while the y-axis corresponds to allowable flow. As one travels away from the origin, attacks get stronger (accuracy lowers) and the
perceptual distance increases. Note that moving from dark to light colour corresponds to increase in value. Crucially, along an isoline on
the left, the minimal LPIPS distance is not obtained on either axis, implying combination attacks yield more perceptually indistinguishable
results.
LPIPS values correspond with decreasing (1 - SSIM) values,
suggesting that these results are likely independent of the
perceptual metrics.
The heatmaps present in Figure 4 display the strength and
LPIPS distance of combined flow and additive attacks as a
function of the bounds of the threat model of each. Observe
the near-linearity in contours of the strength heatmap, indi-
cating that there is a natural tradeoff between flow and addi-
tive noise yielding attacks of equivalent strength. The LPIPS
heatmap, however tells a different story - notably, there are
segments where the contours are near-perpendicular to the
strength contours. This lends further credence to the idea
that it is possible to generate a stronger and more percep-
tually indistinguishable attack by utilizing a combination
threat model than either threat model in isolation.
To further support the claim that combination attacks can
generate more perceptually indistinguishable attacks, we
perform a modified Carlini-Wagner attack where the dis-
tance metric used is the LPIPS perceptual metric, and two
(unbounded) threat models are considered: one using only
a parameterization of additive noise, and another using a
parameterization of a spatial and additive attack. Such an
attack is certainly overpowered due to the unboundedness
in the threat model, achieving misclassification in all input
images considered. The corresponding perceptual distance
of each of these attacks against our Delta defended network
is displayed in table 4. Observe that directly regularizing
against perceptual metrics generates vastly more imperceiv-
able attacks according to both metrics considered. Interest-
ingly, the combination attacks yield perceptual distances
that are significantly smaller than their corresponding at-
Table 4. Carlini Wagner style attacks performed with LPIPS used
as a distance metric against our Delta defended network. Both of
these attacks are successful on 100% of the examples considered;
however when the parameterization of transformations includes
a spatial transformer, the adversary is able to generate examples
with lower perceptual distance.
Parameterization LPIPS distance (1-SSIM)
Delta 0.231 0.0383
Delta + Flow 0.158 0.0245
tacks parameterized only by an additive delta, which holds
over both perceptual metrics.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we aim to generate adversarial examples of
minimal distortion under a perceptual metric. To our knowl-
edge, we are the first to employ these metrics, commonly
used in several other applications, to the adversarial exam-
ple domain. We present a framework that allows for the
combination of various styles of adversarial attacks in or-
der to better parameterize the space of perceptually similar
images. We support this by first proving that combined
attacks can result in images previously unattainable by in-
dividual attacks. Empirically we apply our combination
attacks to show that adversarial defenses do not transfer
their robustness properties to unseen attack styles. Finally,
we demonstrate that combination attacks can generate ad-
versarial examples that are both significantly stronger and
more perceptually indistinguishable than any pure attack
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alone.
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A. Threat Model Search Space
We first describe notation we use throughout the proofs and
tie it back to the perturbations we experiment with. We then
formulate and prove our main result.
A.1. Notation and Preliminaries
In this section, we treat an image as a two-dimensional grid
of pixels. Each pixel has some value corresponding to its
color value, which is some number between 0 and 255. We
define a quadrant associated with pixel x to be a grid of four
pixels defined by pixels in the neighborhood of x. Figure
5 depicts four quadrants surrounding a reference pixel x00.
If our reference pixel for some fixed quadrant is x, then we
relabel this pixel x00. The remaining pixels in the quadrant
are then relabeled according to Figure 6.
Figure 5. The figure above depicts four quadrants surrounding
some interior reference pixel x(0,0). Note that border or corner
pixels will not have four surrounding quadrants.
Our result is dependent on the changes between pixels in
some neighborhood. The following definition formalizes
the notion of local change we use throughout the remainder
of this section.
Definition 3 (Local changes). We define the following quan-
tities pertaining to local changes with respect to some ref-
erence pixel. We first define the local change between the
reference pixel and its neighboring pixels:
Cmax(x00) := max
i,j∈{−1,0,1}
|xij − x00|
We also consider the maximum local change while only
taking into account the off-diagonal pixels. This can be
written below:
Emax(x00) := max
i,j∈{−1,0,1}s.t.|i|6=|j|
|xij − x00|
We also treat perturbations as functions f : X × Θ → X
that take as input a pixel x in the space of possible pixels
X and perturbation parameters θ and outputs another pixel.
For clarity, we denote the flow perturbation function as fflow
and the `∞ perturbation as fadd. Furthermore, observe that
a perturbation’s parameters θ must be constrained by some
preset threat model.
We now describe the perturbations we consider in our result.
Quantifying Flow Suppose our threat model allows a
maximum flow perturbation at each pixel to be . Thus,
for any pixel, observe the following bounds on the horizon-
tal and vertical flows (respectively) for a given pixel:
0 ≤ h, v ≤ 
Now, recall that a flow perturbation entails performing grid
sampling from the grid of images, where the sampling is
performed by bilinear interpolation. In other words, a pixel
can flow into one of the (at most) four quadrants depicted in
Figure 5. To explicitly quantify the value our new pixel
assumes upon performing the bilinear interpolation, we
state and prove the following key known equality we use
throughout our proofs.
Figure 6. The figure above depicts a single quadrant with reference
pixel x00. If we wish to perturb x00 to x′00 using a flow perturba-
tion, then h and v give the necessary horizontal flow and vertical
parameters, respectively. This figure also depicts our pixel labeling
convention once we select a quadrant.
Lemma 1. If a pixel x00 is perturbed by a flow attack into
a quadrant whose corners are x00, x01, x10, and x11, and
if the horizontal and vertical perturbations are given by h
and v respectively, then
fflow(x00, (h, v)) = x00 + (x10 − x00) ((1− v) h)
+ (x01 − x00) (v (1− h))
+ (x11 − x00) (vh) .
Proof. We use the bilinear interpolation procedure. Without
loss of generality, we apply the horizontal perturbations first.
The endpoints of the line we must vertically interpolate over
are now:
x00 (1− h) + x10h and x01 (1− h) + x11h.
Performing the vertical interpolation yields:
(1− v) (x00 (1− h) + x10h) + v (x01 (1− h) + x11h)
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Rearranging the above gives the result.
Note that the magnitude of this perturbation can be ex-
pressed in terms of the pixel differences between the pixels
in the appropriate quadrant and the reference pixel:
|fflow(x00, (h, v))− x00| = |(x10 − x00) ((1− v) h)
+ (x01 − x00) (v (1− h))
+ (x11 − x00) (vh) |.
Observe that as a consequence of the way we characterize
flow perturbations, our flow upper bound  must lie in [0, 1].
Thus, the set of all allowable outputs using a flow threat
model with parameter  is:
{fflow(x, (h, v)) | 0 ≤ h, v ≤ }
We can also specify the perturbation for the δ addition trans-
formation:
fadd(x, δ) = x+ δ
As a result, the set of all allowable outputs using a δ addition
threat model with parameter δ is:
{fadd(x, δa) | |δa| ≤ δ}
A.2. Main Theorem and Proof
We now state and prove our main result.
Theorem 2 (Formal version of Theorem 1). Consider an im-
age I and associated `∞ and flow perturbation constraints
of δ and , respectively. Suppose there exist two distinct
pixels p, q ∈ I such that Cmax(p) < δ2 and Emax(q) ≥ δ .
Then, we can apply an δ addition to p and a flow pertur-
bation to q which results in a new image I ′ that is not
attainable by using solely a δ addition or solely a flow per-
turbation.
Proof. To prove our main theorem, it suffices prove the fol-
lowing two lemmas. The first lemma characterizes regions
of our image that may benefit more from additive changes
than from geometric changes. Such regions of the image
may exhibit local smoothness, and as a result, there is not
much geometry present to modify.
Lemma 2. Suppose that for some pixel x00, we have
Cmax(x00) <
δ
2 . Then, it follows that an attack using
a δ addition results in a greater perturbation than an attack
using at most  flow.
Proof. To prove the lemma, we must show that for all flows,
the maximum pixel change is less than δ. Without loss of
generality, assume the flow moves to the top right quadrant.
Then we have:
|f(x00, (h, v))− x00|
= |(x10 − x00) (h (1− v)) + (x01 − x00) (v (1− h))
+ (x11 − x00) hv|
≤ |x10 − x00| (h (1− v)) + |x01 − x00| (v (1− h))
+ |x11 − x00| hv
≤ Cmax(x00) ((1− h) v + (1− v) h + vh)
= Cmax(x00) (h + v − vh)
≤ 2Cmax(x00) < δ
Here the second inequality follows from observing that
for any possible pixel change in the neighborhood,
|xij − x00| ≤ Cmax(x00) < δ. The third inequality fol-
lows from setting h, v ≤ .
The following lemma characterizes regions of our image
that are not locally smooth. Such regions of the image
have extensive geometry that a flow attack might be able
to exploit in ways that an `∞ attack cannot. We explicitly
describe one such sufficient condition for this to occur.
Lemma 3. Consider some reference pixel x00, if
Emax(x00) >
δ
 , a flow attack on x00 with limit δ can
result in a greater pixel change than an additive change of
at most δ on x00.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose |x01 − x00| ≥ δ .
Set h = 0 and v = . Using Lemma 1, we have
|f(x00, (0, ))− x00|
= | (x10 − x00) (h (1− v)) + (x01 − x00) (v (1− h))
+ (x11 − x00) hv|
=  |(x01 − x00)| >  · δ

> δ.
This gives us a flow attack that is more powerful that a δ
additive attack.
Consider the pixels in our image satisfying the conditions
required by Lemma 2. By using a δ addition on these pix-
els instead of using a flow perturbation, we can achieve a
greater pixel difference between the perturbed image and
the original image than any flow attack. Similarly, we can
achieve greater pixel differences if we use a flow pertur-
bation on the pixels satisfying the conditions required by
Lemma 3 instead of a δ addition. Since by the assump-
tion in the theorem, both these sets are non-empty, we can
produce an image that was not attainable solely by either
perturbation.
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Figure 7. Left three images: An example from ImageNet highlighting the low and high contrast conditions we impose. The leftmost
image is the original image. We then take the blue channel and apply our condition to the resulting pixel values. The middle image
highlights in white the areas of low contrast. The right image highlights in white the areas of high contrast. Right: Scatter plot depicting
the percentage of pixels satisfying each condition across 384 randomly sampled examples from CIFAR-10.
A.3. Existence of High and Low Contrast Areas
It is important to note that for our theorem statement to
hold, we require that there exist low contrast areas as well
as high contrast areas. To verify this, we inspected 384
randomly selected examples from CIFAR-10 and counted
how many pixels satisfy our low or high contrast condi-
tions. Our results are detailed in Figure 7. Notably, a large
fraction of pixels in each image we sampled satisfies one
of our constraints, and every image contains at least one
high and low contrast area3. This indicates that combining
these attacks gives us the power of exploring a larger set
of potential adversarial images compared to any one attack
individually.
B. Images
3The two constraints are disjoint, so at most one can be satisfied
for a given pixel.
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Figure 8. Top: Various CIFAR-10 images with various successful attacks against an undefended network on each row. From top to bottom
these are: originals, delta, StAdv, delta + StAdv, rot+trans, delta + rot + trans, delta + StAdv + rot + trans. Bottom: The differences
between originals magnified by 5
.
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Figure 9. Same figure as 8 but with attacks performed against a delta-trained network
.
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Figure 10. Same figure as 8 but with attacks performed against a delta + stadv trained network
.
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Figure 11. Top: Various ImageNet images with various successful attacks against an NasnetAMobile network on each row. From top to
bottom these are: originals, delta, stAdv, delta + stAdv, rot+trans, delta + rot + trans. Bottom: The differences between originals magnified
by 10. From this it is clear that completely imperceivable perturbations are all that is necessary to fool undefended ImageNet networks
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Figure 12. Same as figure 11
